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et al.: Products Liability: The Victim's Conduct as a Bar to Recovery—The

PRODUCTS LIABILITY: THE VICTIM'S CONDUCT
AS A BAR TO RECOVERY-THE MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT
REAFFIRMS THE MA GNUSON "LIMITING FACTORS"
[Waite v. American Creosote Works,
295 Minn. 288, 204 N.W.2d 410 (1973)].
I. INTRODUCTION

With the advent of Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts' and
the decision of the California Supreme Court in Greenman v. Yuba Power
Products,' strict liability in tort expanded rapidly as a preferred theory of
recovery in personal injury cases arising out of the use of defective products.'
In the decade since strict liability was first advanced as a viable theory of
recovery, the application of the doctrine has produced confusion, in large part
because of the repetition of strict liability rubric without a clear analysis of
the meaning and purpose of strict liability.'
This confusion was well illustrated in Magnuson v. Rupp Manufacturing,
Inc.,- a 1969 decision of the Minnesota Supreme Court, recently reaffirmed
in Waite v. American Creosote Works, Inc.' It is the purpose of this comment to analyze the law in Waite and Magnuson in light of recent products
liability developments and to suggest a more appropriate rationale of products liability law in Minnesota.
II. THE EvOLUTION

OF WAITE

The Minnesota Supreme Court first approved Section 402A seven years
ago in McCormack v. Hankscraft Co.7 The policy rationale underlying the
court's decision to adopt Section 402A for subsequent cases was the desirability of imposing the cost of accidents arising out of the use of defective
products upon the maker of the product. The manufacturer is the better lossbearer because he is in a better position to reduce or eliminate the risk of
1. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
2. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962).
3. 1 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 3, at 1-29 to 1-30 (1973).
It was stated in this treatise in 1964: "the courts generally are reluctant to impose strict

liability as such. It does not seem to trouble them so much when they do so under the
guise of finding a breach of warranty." This statement is no longer accurate in light of
the trend toward strict liability in tort since that date. Id.
4. See Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972);
Luque v. McLean, 8 Cal. 3d 136, 501 P.2d 1163, 104 Cal. Rptr. 443 (1972).

5. 285 Minn. 32, 171 N.W.2d 201 (1969).
6. 295 Minn. 288, 204 N.W.2d 410 (1973).

7. 278 Minn. 322, 154 N.W.2d 488 (1967). Hankscraft did not lay down any rules for the
application of strict tort liability except to say that the theory would be thereafter recognized
when the facts required.
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injury and to absorb or pass on the costs than is the consumer who is without
the necessary expertise or ability to protect himself from either the risk or the
pecuniary consequences of injury.8
The first Minnesota case to actually apply Section 402A was Kerr v. Corning Glass Works,' in which the supreme court set out the necessary elements
of proof in a strict liability case. The court stated that in order for a plaintiff
to recover on a strict liability theory he must prove that:
(1) he was injured;
(2) the injury was caused by a defect in defendant's product; and
(3) the defect was present in the product when it was sold by the defendant."0
In Kerr, the plaintiff had been injured when a baking dish manufactured by
the defendant exploded. Applying the above elements the court held that the
plaintiffs should be denied recovery because of their inability to show that the
defect in the baking dish, a bruise in its bottom, had existed when the dish left
the hands of the defendant." Though the case was tried on a res ipsa loquitur
theory, the plaintiffs were denied the benefit of the inference that the bruise
existed when the dish left the hands of the manufacturer. Because the dish had
been out of the control of the defendant for a period of at least 7 months, and
possibly as long as 47 months, before it exploded, it was equally probable that
its bruise was caused by some mishandling of an intervening party.'
Almost immediately following its decision in Kerr, the Minnesota court
reconsidered its strict liability formulation. In Magnuson v. Rupp Manufacturing, Inc.,"3 the court considered Section 402A in detail, emphasizing the
necessity of establishing limitations on the rule of strict liability to prevent its
4
transformation to absolute liability.
The limiting factors proposed by the court in Magnuson took the form of a
8. Id. at 338, 154 N.W.2d at 500. The theory behind the rule of strict liability is that the
pecuniary loss will ultimately fall on the one who caused it. First Nat'l Bank v. Otis Elevator Co.,
2 Ariz. App. 80, 406 P.2d 430 (Ct. App. 1965). One purpose of imposing strict products liability
is to insure that the costs of injuries resulting from defective products are borne by the makers
of the products rather than the injured persons. Other reasons are the implied representation by
the manufacturer or seller that the products are suitable and safe for their intended use, and the
fact that the manufacturer and seller are in a better position than the consumer to know the
condition of the product. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment c at 349-50
(1965). See Jackson v. Muhlenberg Hosp., 96 N.J. Super. 314, 232 A.2d 879 (Super. Ct. 1967),
rev'd on other grounds, 53 N.J. 137,249 A.2d 65 (1969) (dictum).
9. 284 Minn. 115, 169 N.W.2d 587 (1969).
10. Id. at 117, 169 N.W.2d at 588.
11. Id. at 118-19, 169 N.W.2d at 589.
12. Id. at 119, 169 N.W.2d at 589.
13. 285 Minn. 32, 171 N.W.2d 201 (1969).
14. Id. at 45, 171 N.W.2d at 209.
Liability on the basis of implied warranty or breach of a tort duty is not so strict or
absolute as to justify recovery on the part of the user who merely shows that an injury
was suffered in the course of the use .... Everyone would recognize that a manufacturer is not responsible for any and every hurt that one suffers. Therefore, the courts
which impose strict liability eliminating negligence must adopt some rules or principles
as a substitute for negligence as a delimiting principle. Id.
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"five-point" test for liability, requiring a plaintiff to prove: (1) that there was
a defect, (2) that it caused unreasonable danger, (3) that it was in existence at
the time the property was in possession of the defendant to be charged,
(4) that it caused injury, and (5) that the injury was not caused by any voluntary, unusual, or abnormal handling by the plaintiff. 5 The court indicated
that a plaintiff, to meet the fifth requirement, must prove that he made a
proper use of the product, 6 that he was in the exercise of due care for his own
safety,17 that he was not aware of the defect," s and that he did not mishandle
the product."9 The first four requirements were equivalent to the test set forth
in Kerr and contained nothing new or startling. The fifth requirement, however, first formulated in Magnuson, was to cause lingering controversy.
In Magnuson the plaintiff was injured when he was thrown from his snowmobile, striking his knee on a protruding sparkplug. The location of the
sparkplug was obvious, and the plaintiff was well aware of it."° That awareness had a significant effect on the court's analysis and application of strict
liability law. The court held that the plaintiff's awareness of the sparkplug's
condition negatived the existence of both defect 2 and the unreasonably
dangerous condition required by Section 402A. 22 The court also found that
the plaintiff's use of the snowmobile while aware of the positioning of the
sparkplug was a superseding, intervening cause of the accident.23 In addition,
the court said that where the defect is obvious, the plaintiff must show a
proper use of the product.2' Finally, the court stated, as a policy matter, that
if the purpose of strict liability is to permit reliance on the manufacturer to
supply a product in accordance with his representations, then the product is
2
not defective if it is no different than the consumer expects it to be. 1
The significance of the court's decision is in its insistence upon all five
elements as requirements of a plaintiff's proof and in the manner in which the
court interpreted and applied the elements of strict liability. The decision in
Magnuson seemed to restrict severely a plaintiff's ability to recover under a
15. Id. at 39-40, 171 N.W.2d at 206.
16. Id. at 45, 171 N.W.2d at 209.
17. Id. at 43, 171 N.W.2d at 208. The court does not explicitly adopt this as an element of
proof, but their intention to produce that result is evidenced by their supplying of emphasis to the
words "[T]he Illinois Court indicated that it is .. . necessary to prove that the plaintiffwas in the
exercise of due carefor his own safety," and by their statement in the syllabus by the court that
"[e]ven though strict liability may be adopted, it is nevertheless necessary to prove that plaintiff
was in the exercise of due care for his own safety." Id. at 33, 171 N.W.2d at 203.
18. Id. at 40-41, 171 N.W.2d at 207.
19. Id. at 42-43, 171 N.W.2d at 208.
20. Id. at 41, 171 N.W.2d at 207.
21. Id. at 42, 171 N.W.2d at 208.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 43, 171 N.W.2d at 208.
24. Id. at 45, 171 N.W.2d at 209.
25. Id. at 45, 171 N.W.2d at 209-10.
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strict liability theory.
In the 3 years following the Magnuson decision, however, the Minnesota
Supreme Court failed to apply the rules and principles established in Magnuson as limiting factors in a strict liability action. None of the cases decided
during this period26 mentioned the "five-point" test. During this period there
were indications that the court had adopted the test set forth in the concurring
opinion in Magnuson,2 rather than the majority opinion. In Farr v. Armstrong Rubber Co. 28 and Lee v. Crookston Coca-Cola Bottling Co.291 the court
held that in order to establish a prima facie case of strict liability against a
manufacturer, a plaintiff need merely introduce evidence that: (1) he was
injured by the product, (2) the product was in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous for its use, and (3) the defective condition existed when
the product left the hands of the manufacturer." The court concluded that
where the evidence would reasonably support a finding of these three elements, the plaintiff would be entitled to a jury instruction on strict liability.',
Although Magnuson was cited in both Farr and Lee as authority for the
holdings, the court did not refer to the fifth requirement of the "five-point"
test set forth by the majority in Magnuson. Both Lee and Holkestad v.
Coca-Cola Bottling Co. 31 involved explosions of bottles containing carbonated beverages. In both cases the Minnesota Supreme Court was concerned
with the question of whether the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, irrelevant in
Kerr, could be applied. In discussing the core of the res ipsa inference, the
requirement that it be more probable than not that the defect existed when
the product left the hands of the defendant,3 the Lee court stated the obvious
proposition that a plaintiff, to avail himself of the desired inference, must
eliminate the probablility of mishandling by some intervening party. 4 Lee
and Holkestad, therefore, both entailed the possibility of mishandling or
abnormal handling, either by the plaintiffs or by intermediate handlers of the
26. Lee v. Crookston Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 290 Minn. 321, 188 N.W.2d 426 (1971);
Holkestad v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 288 Minn. 249, 180 N.W.2d 860 (1970); Farr v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 288 Minn. 83, 179 N.W.2d 64 (1970).
27. 285 Minn. at 46-47, 171 N.W.2d at 210 (Rogosheske, J., concurring).
In order to establish a prima facie case of strict liability against a manufacturer, a
plaintiff merely need introduce evidence showing (1) that the product he purchased was
in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous for its use, (2) that such defective condition existed when the product left the hands of the manufacturer, and (3) that the
defect was the proximate cause of the injury he suffered. Where the evidence introduced
would reasonably support a finding of these three elements, plaintiff is entitled to a
jury instruction on strict liability. Id. (footnotes omitted).
28. 288 Minn. 83, 179 N.W.2d 64 (1970).
29. 290 Minn. 321, 1,88 N.W.2d426 (1971).
30. 290 Minn. at 329, 188 N.W.2d at 432; 288 Minn. at 90-91, 179 N.W.2d at 69.
31. 288 Minn. at 91, 179 N.W.2d at 69.
32. 288 Minn. 249, 180 N.W.2d 860 (1970).
33. 290 Minn. at 330-31, 188 N.W.2d at 432-33; 288 Minn. at 257, 180 N.W.2d at 865-66
(dictum). See W. PROSSER, THE HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 103, at 671-73 (4th ed.
1971).
34. 290 Minn. at 329, 188 N.W.2d at 432.
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beverage bottles. The court in both cases found that those possibilities had
been sufficiently negatived to allow the plaintiff to take advantage of the inference that the defect must have existed when the bottles left the hands of the
defendants. 35 Applying the elements of a strict liability case as set out either in
Farror Lee leads to the same conclusion.3
In such a fact situation, application of the fifth element in the test set out
by the court in Magnuson is only a restatement of the obvious, that the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case that the defect existed when the bottles
left the hands of the defendants. To characterize such a plaintiffs conduct as
abnormal or unusual use is simply to subsume those terms under the general
heading of causation. In this situation, therefore, the fifth element of Magnuson merely confuses a very basic element of causation.
If the fifth requirement in Magnuson is viewed as only a restatement of a
simple causation issue, however, the plaintiff in that case should have been
able to meet it. The defect was, as stated, obvious." The plaintiff established
the dangerous position of the sparkplug and the fact of injury. 8 Any attempts
to show a misuse of the snowmobile or mishandling on the part of the plaintiff
should properly have been raised by way of defense or by way of rebuttal to
39
the plaintiff's prima facie case of strict liability.
The plaintiffs awareness of the defect, however, resulted in a different
analysis and imposed a greater burden upon plaintiff than that found in cases,
such as Lee and Holkestad, involving latent defects. The plaintiff's awareness
of the sparkplug's position negatived the existence of a defect" and also
made it impossible for the plaintiff to prove that the condition was unreasonably dangerous." This analysis could not, of course, have been used in Lee
and Holkestad. In addition, the court stated that where a defect is obvious the
plaintiff must show that he made a proper use of the product. Awareness,
therefore, seems to have shifted the burden on the misuse issue from the
defendant to the plaintiff.
What the Minnesota Supreme Court appears to have established in the
strict liability cases it has considered is a distinction between the treatment of
latent and patent defects. Under Minnesota law, where the plaintiff is aware
of the defect, his ability to recover would seem to be severely restricted. This
apparent dichotomy between the treatment of the two types of cases, turning
on the question of the plaintiffs awareness of the defect, makes Waite's
reaffirmation of the fifth element of the Magnuson test puzzling.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
Supp.
40.
41.
42.

Id. at 333, 188 N.W.2d at 434; 288 Minn. at 254-55, 180 N.W.2d at 864-65.
See text accompanying note 30 supra.
See text accompanying note 20 supra.
Cf 285 Minn. at 46-47, 171 N.W.2d at 210 (concurring opinion).
See R. HURSH & H. BAILEY, AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 5A:25 (Cum.
1973).
See note 21 supra and accompanying text.
See note 22 supra and accompanying text.
See note 24 supra and accompanying text.
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There were no issues raised in Waite as to the awareness of the plaintiff or of
any possible intervening mishandling.
This creates doubts as to whether the latent-patent distinction is justifiable,
and, even assuming no such distinction is made, whether the fifth element of
the Magnuson test is analytically worthwhile. The remainder of this comment
will, therefore, analyze the major elements of a products liability case as set
out by the Minnesota Supreme Court with a view toward determining a more
appropriate rationalization of strict liability theory in Minnesota.
111. A

POINT-BY-POINT ANALYSIS OF THE "FIVE-POINT"

TEST

A. The Existence of a Defect
In Magnuson, the Minnesota Supreme Court stated that, since the plaintiff

was aware of the position of the sparkplug, it could not be considered to be
defective as to him. The court seems to have said, based upon a quotation
from Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.,' 3 that the factor of awareness will render no longer defective an otherwise clearly defective product."
The quoted portion of Greenman reads as follows:
To establish the manufacturer's liability it was sufficient that plaintiff
proved that he was injured while using the Shopsmith in a way it was intended
to be used as a result of a defect in design and manufacture of which plaintiff
was not aware that made the Shopsmith unsafe for its intended use." '
While this excerpt from Greenman may have been subject to differing interpretations at that time, the California Supreme Court, in light of the
apparent confusion surrounding the interpretation and application of Greenman, has now clarified its position on the issue. In Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson
Corp." and Luque v. McLean17 the California Supreme Court stated that, although the above-cited portion of the Greenman decision has been applied by
the courts as the holding of the case, it was meant only to be a recitation of the
facts that plaintiff had established at trial. The true holding of the case is:
A manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the
market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection for defects, proves
to have a defect that causes injury to a human being."'" It seems obvious from
the holding itself and from the subsequent explanation of that holding in
Cronin and Luque that the question of awareness of the defect, if it enters into
the litigation at all, must enter as an element of assumption of the risk. 9
43. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962).
44. 285 Minn. at 40-42, 171 N.W.2d at 207-08.
45. 59 Cal. 2d at 64. 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701.
46. 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972).
47. 8 Cal. 3d 136, 501 P.2d 1163, 104 Cal. Rptr. 443 (1972).
48. Id. at 141-44, 501 P.2d at 1166-69, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 446-49, quoting Greenman v. Yuba
Products Co., 59 Cal. 2d 57. 63, 377 P.2d 897. 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 700 (1962).
49. In Luque, the California court noted that the awareness language in Greenman was
susceptible of two interpretations. First, it might mean that the defect must be latent, and second,
it might mean that the defect must be one as to which the plaintiff has not assumed the risk of
injury. 8 Cal. 3d at 144, 501 P.2d at 1168, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 448. For a discussion of assumption
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Since the excerpt from Greenman relied upon by the court in Magnuson
has been subsequently explained so as to negate the interpretation given the
opinion in that latter case, any further reliance upon the earlier analysis
would be misplaced. There remains only the basic definition of defect adopted
by the Minnesota court as a test of liability: "If an article is defective, not
reasonably fit for ordinary purposes for which it was sold or used, a defect
arises out of the manufacture and if it proximately causes the injury, then
liability exists." 0 Since it is arguable that the snowmobile was not fit for the
ordinary purposes for which it was intended, snowmobiling,.the plaintiff in
Magnuson should have been able to reach a jury on the question of the
existence of a defect.
B. The Causation Question
As to causation, the Minnesota Supreme Court stated in Magnuson:
Defendant contends that the injury was proximately caused by the act of the
plaintiff in the operation of the snowmobile and not by any defect that is or
was unreasonably dangerous. It can also be argued that even though there was
a defect, plaintiffs operation of the snowmobile was a superseding, interving cause and proximate cause of the injury. Here again the awareness is

important. Plaintiff being aware of the sparkplug and claiming it to be defective and then doing what he did, it would appear that defendant would be
proximate cause of the
insulated from responsibility because the direct and
5
injury was plaintiffs operation of the snowmobile.

That causation analysis seems unduly artificial and is somewhat reminiscent
of previous judicial struggles to determine, in negligence cases, the sole proximate cause of an injury.5 2 With the advent of comparative negligence
statutes, however, the courts acquired added flexibility in the determination
and submission to juries of causation questions. 53
An analysis of the Magnuson facts on the basis of general negligence
principles serves to demonstrate the artificiality of the court's resolution of
the causation issue. Following Springrosev. Willmore,14 in which the Minnesota Supreme Court eliminated the distinctions between contributory negligence and assumption of risk, the issue of contributory fault on the part of
the plaintiff, however characterized, would, in the ordinary negligence case,
be submitted to the jury under the comparative negligence statute.55 Rather
than determine as a matter of law the sole cause of an accident, therefore, the
question is left to the jury to assess proportionate degrees of fault on the part
of risk and the concept of awareness, see notes 124 to 137 infra and accompanying text.
50. 285 Minn. at 40, 171 N.W.2d at 207.
51. Id. at 43, 171 N.W.2d at 208.
52. See generally Green, The CausalRelation Issue in Negligence Law, 60 MICH. L. REv. 543
(1962).
53. See, e.g., Riley v. Lake, 295 Minn. 43, 203 N.W.2d 331 (1972); Winge v. Minnesota
Transfer Ry., 294 Minn. 399, 201 N.W.2d 259 (1972).
54. 292 Minn. 23, 192 N.W.2d 826 (1971).
55. Id. at 24-25, N.W.2d at 827.
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of each party who has contributed to the accident.
While this is not meant to be an argument in favor of the application of
comparative fault to strict liability cases, it does serve to illustrate the artificiality of any attempt to resolve Magnuson in terms of causation. It seems
clear that the snowmobile was defective and that the defect was a cause of
Magnuson's injuries. The more intricate causation analysis only serves to
obscure the true issue of whether the plaintiff's conduct, in the specific case,
however labeled, is so blameworthy that it should bar his recovery. Taking a
similar approach, the Magnuson concurring opinion acknowledged the
presence of the defect and proximately caused injury and focused on the
plaintiff's conduct as a legal bar to his recovery. 5' That approach is procedurally and analytically sound.
C. Existence of the Defect at the Time of Sale by the Defendant
Mishandling of the product will bar plaintiff's recovery under the Magnuson test.57 It is semantically and conceptually difficult to distinguish mishandling from misuse. The latter, however, is generally limited to the plaintiff's unforeseeable and improper use of the product, 58 while the former
includes any substantial alteration of the product after it leaves the defendant's possession if that alteration causes the defect or combines with a
pre-existing defect to cause the injury. 9 If the product left the possession of
the seller while in a safe condition and the conduct of the consumer or some
third person caused the defect or combined with the defect to cause the
56. 285 Minn. at 48-50, 171 N.W.2d at 211-12.
57. "[Flor the doctrine to apply, there must be no mishandling after manufacture .. ."Id. at
42, 171 N.W.2d at 208.
58. O.S. Stapely Co. v. Miller, 103 Ariz. 556, 447 P.2d 248 (1968); Jacobs v. Technical Chem.
Co., 472 S.W.2d 191 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971).
One federal court has defined misuse as follows:
Neither would contributory negligence constitute a defense, although use different than
that contemplated to be safe by ordinary users/consumers, that is, "misuse," would
refute a defective condition or causation. "Misuse" would include much conduct otherwise labeled contributory negligence and would constitute a defense. Greeno v. Clark
Equip. Co., 237 F. Supp. 427,429 (N.D. Ind. 1965).
59. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A at 347-48 (1965).
(1)One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the
user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby
caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change
in the condition in which it is sold. Id.
The comments explain the import of the last clause of this section as follows:
The rule stated in this Section applies only where the product is, at the time it leaves the
seller's hands, in a condition not contemplated by the ultimate consumer, which will be
unreasonably dangerous to him. The seller is not liable when he delivers the product in a
safe condition, and subsequent mishandling or other causes make it harmful by the time
it is consumed. The burden of proof that the product was in a defective condition at the
time it left the hands of the particular seller is upon the injured plaintiff; and unless
evidence can be produced which will support the conclusion that it was then defective,
the burden is not sustained. Id. comment g at 351.
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60
injury, many courts deny recovery.
Such an alteration may occur in any one of the three ways. First, the product may require further processing before use by the ultimate consumer and
the defect may be created in the course of that processing. Second, a third
person may have control of the product before it reaches the ultimate consumer, and he may tamper with the product or carelessly damage it in a
manner that will make it defective. Third, the ultimate consumer may tamper
with or damage the product after receiving it or permit someone else to do so
while it is in his control.
That either of the last two listed events will relieve the manufacturer of
liability is clear. 6 The effect of the former is less certain, but it appears that
whether responsibility for the condition of the product will be shifted to the
processor will depend upon the nature of the services he is to perform and the
extent that he is expected to alter the product.62 Because few courts have considered this troublesome question in any depth, the Restatement contains a
caveat as to whether Section 402A will apply to the seller of a product which
is expected to be substantially changed before it reaches the user or
63
consumer.
To implement that caveat, the Restatement requires the plaintiff to establish that the product was in a defective condition at the time that it left the
hands of the defendant. 4 Plaintiff can do so by showing that the product was

60. See, e.g., Speyer, Inc. v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 403 F.2d 766 (3d Cir. 1968), affg, 275
F. Supp. 861 (W.D. Pa. 1967), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 1015 (1969); Greeno v. Clark Equip. Co.,
237 F. Supp. 427 (N.D. Ind. 1965); Erickson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 240 Cal. App. 2d 742, 50
Cal. Rptr. 143 (Dist. Ct. App. 1966). See generally R. HURSH & H. BAILEY, AMERICAN LAW OF
PRODUCTS LIABILITY, supra note 39, at § 5A:10; Annot., 13 A.L.R.3d 1057, 1082-84 (1967).
61.

1 R.

HURSH & H. BAILEY, AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY 2D § 1:30 (1974).

62. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §402A, comment p at 357 (1965).
Thus far the decisions applying the rule stated have not gone beyond products which are
sold in the condition, or in substantially the same condition, in which they are expected
to reach the hands of the ultimate user or consumer....
It seems reasonably clear that the mere fact that the product is to undergo processing,
or other substantial change, will not in all cases relieve the seller of liability under the
rule stated in this Section. If, for example, raw coffee beans are sold to a buyer who
roasts and packs them for sale to the ultimate consumer, it cannot be supposed that
the seller will be relieved of all liability when the raw beans are contaminated with
arsenic, or some other poison. Likewise the seller of an automobile with a defective
steering gear which breaks and injures the driver, can scarcely expect to be relieved of
the responsibility by reason of the fact that the car is sold to a dealer who is expected to
"service" it, adjust the brakes, mount and inflate the tires, and the like, before it is
ready for use. On the other hand, the manufacturer of pigiron, which is capable of a
wide variety of uses, is not so likely to be held to strict liability when it turns out to be
unsuitable for the child's tricycle into which it is finally made by a remote buyer. The
question is essentially one of whether the responsibility for discovery and prevention of
the dangerous defect is shifted to the intermediate party who is to make the changes. No
doubt there will be some situations, and some defects, as to which the responsibility will
be shifted, and others in which it will not ....

Id.

63. Id. Caveat 2 at 348. "The Institute expresses no opinion as to whether the rules stated in
this Section may not apply ... (2) to the seller of a product expected to be processed or otherwise
substantially changed before it reaches the user or consumer ... " Id.
64. Id. comment g at 351.
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expected to and did reach him without substantial change of condition. 5 Thus
where the defect is such that it cannot be traced directly back to defendant,
the plaintiff must be able to eliminate intermediate mishandling as a cause of
the defect."
When the Magnuson requirement that the plaintiff negative mishandling as
part of his prima facie case is viewed in this context, it would appear that the
court is merely attempting to impose the general Restatement rule that the
plaintiff must establish that the product was defective at the time that it left
the hands of the defendant.
D. The Unreasonably Dangerous Condition of the Product
The unreasonably dangerous requirement adopted by the Minnesota court
has been generally recognized as a necessary element of a plaintiff's proof in a
strict liability action. 7 The Restatement requires plaintiff to establish not only
that the product in question was defective, but also that its defective condition
was "unreasonably dangerous" to the plaintiff or his property. In defining
what is meant by "unreasonably dangerous," the comments state that the
product "must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary
knowledge common to the community as to its character."" s The expectation
of the ordinary user is, therefore, the controlling factor. 9
The ordinary consumer test embodies two related, but separable, principles.
First, a product which contains hidden dangers unfairly surprises the user
who is without the ability or resources to inspect and test it himself. 0 Con65. Id.
66. See. e.g., Daleiden v. Carborundum Co., 438 F.2d 1017 (8th Cir. 1971):
Circumstantial evidence may be used to establish that the product was defective when
it left the manufacturer's hands.
[But] [iun order to prove a defect, a plaintiff is not required to eliminate with certainty
all possible causes of an accident. It is sufficient if the evidence reasonably eliminates
improper handling or misuse of the product by others than the manufacturer, thus permitting the jury to reasonably infer that it was more probable than not that the product
was defective. Id. at 1021-22. (Citations omitted)
See also Lee v. Crookston Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 290 Minn. 321, 188 N.W.2d 426 (1971):
Pittsburg Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Ponder, 443 S.W.2d 546 (Tex. 1969).
67. See, e.g., Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 399 F.2d 121, 128 (9th Cir. 1968) ("The true
test in a case of this kind is whether the product was unreasonably dangerous."); Mitchell v.
Miller, 26 Conn. Supp. 142, 214 A.2d 694 (Super. Ct. 1965); Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32
Ill. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965); I R. HURSH & H. BAILEY,supra note 61, §4:1 I.
68. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §402A (1965) states that one who sells any product in
a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is
subject to liability for physical harm caused thereby. The comments state that the rule of this
section applies only where the defective condition of the product makes it unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer. Id. comment i at 352-53.
69. See, e.g., Lunt v. Brady Mfg. Co., 13 Ariz. App. 305, 475 P.2d 964 (Ct. App. 1970).
70. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §402A, comment i at 352-53 (1965).
The article sold must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge com-
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versely, some products are so useful or desirable that the dangers they pose
are acceptable if disclosed to the user.7'
It has been argued that a rule of "strict liability" which permits recovery
for injuries arising out of defects in products only when those defects give rise
to unreasonable dangers is borrowed from negligence theory.72 That is an apt
observation, since both traditional negligence analysis and the "unreasonable
danger" analysis make liability depend upon whether the utility of the product
or conduct in question outweighs, in light of all of the circumstances, the
risk of injury and the burden of taking precautions to prevent it.73
In attempting to apply that analysis, Magnuson has confused the ordinary
mon to the community as to its characteristics. . . . Good tobacco is not unreasonably
dangerous merely because the effects of smoking may be harmful; but tobacco containing something like marijuana may be unreasonably dangerous. Good butter is not
unreasonably dangerous merely because, if such be the case, it deposits cholesterol in
the arteries and leads to heart attacks; but bad butter, contaminated with poisonous fish
oil, is unreasonably dangerous. Id.
The comments continue, "In order to prevent the product from being unreasonably dangerous,
the seller may be required to give directions or warnings, on the container, as to its use." Id.
commentj at 353.
There are some products which, in the present state of human knowledge, are quite
incapable of being made safe for their intended and ordinary use. These are especially
common in the field of drugs. An outstanding example is the vaccine for the Pasteur
treatment of rabies, which not uncommonly leads to very serious and damaging consequences when it is injected. Since the disease itself invariably leads to a dreadful
death, both the marketing and the use of the vaccine are fully justified, notwithstanding
the unavoidable high degree of risk which they involve. Such a product, properly prepared, and accompanied by proper directions and warning, is not defective, nor is it
unreasonablydangerous.... The seller of such products, again with the qualification
that they are properly prepared and marketed, and proper warning is given, when the
situation calls for it, is not to be held to strict liability for unfortunate consequences
attending their use, merely because he has undertaken to supply the public with an
apparently useful and desirable product, attended with a known but apparently reasonable risk. Id. comment k at 353-54 (emphasis in original).
72. Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5 (1965).
Thus, the test for imposing strict liability is whether the product was unreasonably
dangerous, to use the language of the Restatement ....
It may be argued that this is simply a test of negligence. Exactly. In strict liability,
except for the element of defendant's scienter, the test is the same as that for negligence.
Id. at 15.
73. Compare Hall v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972)
with United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947). In Hall the court states
that a resolution of the question of whether a product is unreasonably dangerous involves a
balancing of the utility of the product against the magnitude of the risk of injury arising out of its
use. In Carroll Towing the test for the existence of a duty in a negligence action was stated as the
mathematical function of three variables, i.e., whether the burden of taking adequate precautions
is greater than the probability of harm multiplied by the probable gravity of the harm.
One commentator has discussed the manner in which these variables should be balanced in a
strict liability case:
The factors involved in making the determination include: (1) the usefulness and
desirability of the product, (2) the availability of other and safer products to meet the
same need, (3) the likelihood of injury and its probable seriousness, (4) the obviousness
of the danger, (5) common knowledge and normal public expectation of the danger ...
(6) the avoidability of injury by care in the use of the product ... and (7) the ability to
eliminate the danger without seriously impairing the usefulness of the product or
making it unduly expensive. Wade, supra note 72, at 17.
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consumer's awareness of the danger with the individual plaintifrs awareness
of the existence of the defect. Magnuson held that plaintiffs awareness of the
defect is sufficient to take a defective product out of the unreasonably dangerous category, thereby barring a plaintiffs recovery." Even as negligence
analysis this would be improper. Most courts which use the unreasonably
dangerous test apply an objective standard much like that of the reasonable
man and consider the foreseeability of the danger, not the obviousness of the
defect.7" A test of unreasonable danger which relies on the plaintiff's awareness of the defect errs in shifting from an objective to a subjective standard
and in ignoring the question of whether the danger is as obvious as the defect.
The fact that the individual plaintiff is aware of the dangers presented by a
product does not necessarily imply that the ordinary consumer would be
equally aware. At best, the fact of plaintiff's awareness may be some indication that the product is no more dangerous than contemplated by the
ordinary user or consumer. If the individual plaintiff is more informed and
cautious than the ordinary consumer, he will be punished for his vigilance by
the Magnuson rule and denied recovery.7
Although the courts agree that a product cannot be unreasonably dangerous if the ordinary consumer is aware of its dangers, 7 and one can even
argue that a product is not defective in the face of such awareness, 5 there is
no authority for the proposition that the ordinary consumer's mere awareness of the defect will preclude a finding that a product is unreasonably dangerous. Although the Minnesota court could have thought that its contrary
holding was consistent with strict liability's goal of protecting the consumer
against unfair surprise, that theory breaks down when one examines the
nature of the defects and the products marketed in modern society.
The fact that the ordinary consumer is aware of the defect does not necessarily imply that he is equally aware of all of the risks inherent in the defect,
the likelihood of injury, or its possible seriousness. Design defects, for ex-

74. 285 Minn. at 42, 171 N.W.2d at 208. "The awareness, which has been clearly established
by plaintiff's testimony ... certainly takes this snowmobile out of the category of being unreasonably dangerous." Id.
75. See, e.g., Dorsey v. Yoder Co., 331 F.Supp. 753 (E.D. Pa. 1971), in which the court held
that the obviousness of a defect in a product does not bar a finding that it was unreasonably
dangerous. The court also held that the proper test of the unreasonable danger of a product is
whether a reasonable manufacturer would continue to market his product in the same condition
as he sold it to the plaintiff with knowledge of the dangerous consequences.
76. At least one other court may apply a similar rule. See Maas v. Dreher, 10 Ariz. App.
520, 460 P.2d 191 (Ct. App. 1969). That court commented, "The subjective appreciation of
danger by plaintiff might well be pertinent in establishing these affirmative defenses to the
extent that such defenses are applicable in strict liability cases." Id. at 522, 460 P.2d at 193-94.
77. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment i at 352 (1965).
78. Magnuson v. Rupp Mfg. Co., 285 Minn. 32, 45, 171 N.W.2d 201, 210 (1969). "[Plerhaps
the product is not regarded as defective if it is no different from what the consumer expected it to
be." Id.
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ample, are obvious to the consumer in the sense that he is aware of their
existence. Since he is seldom equally aware of the dangers arising out of those
defects, however, the products still should be considered unreasonably dangerous.7" Moreover, the consumer is frequently deceived as to the potential
dangers of such products by the manufacturers' advertisements and representations which give him a false sense of security when buying and using the
products.80
By misapplying the unreasonably dangerous requirement in a manner
which emphasizes its harshness, Magnuson raises the question of whether the
test is worth preserving at all. Although it is still generally Considered an
essential element of a cause of action in strict liability," the unreasonably
dangerous requirement has been criticized for impeding full implementation
2

of the spirit of strict liability.1

The function of the limitation is, at best, unclear. 3 It has been suggested
that the qualification was added to prevent manufacturers of products having
an inherent capacity for causing harm from become insurers of such products."' In practice, however, the effects of the limitation reach far beyond
that modest objective, imposing upon the plaintiff in a strict liability action a
burden of proof more appropriate to a negligence action. That result flies in
5
the face of the declared purpose of the strict liability doctrine.
The similarity between proving negligence and proving the unreasonably
dangerous condition of the product has prompted two courts to abandon the
unreasonably dangerous test. 6 Reasoning that the requirement imposed upon

79. Cf., Robbins & Eisberg, The Legal Subtleties of Strict Liability, in 44 MINNESOTA
PRACTICE MANUAL 83, 94-102 (1970). In analyzing the unreasonably dangerous product, the
authors cite statistics showing that a large number of injuries are caused each year by design
defects in such common household products as doors, washing machines, refrigerators, and
toys. Many of these defects the authors describes are patent. The high rate of injury, however,
certainly indicates that the danger of those defects may not be so obvious.
80. "The consumer no longer has means or skill enough to investigate for himself the soundness of a product ....
and his erstwhile vigilance has been lulled by the steady efforts of manufacturers to build up confidence by advertising and marketing devices such as trademarks." Escola
v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 467, 150 P.2d 436, 443 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring).

81. 1 R. HURSH & H.

BAILEY,

supra note 61, §4:14.

82. Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 133, 501 P.2d 1153, 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr.
433, 442 (1972): Glass v. Ford Motor Co., 123 N.J. Super. 599, 601-03, 304 A.2d 562, 565
(Super. Ct. 1973).
83. Prosser, Strict Liability to the Consumer in California, 18 HASTINGS L.J. 9, 23 (1966).
84. Id.
85. Cronin v.J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972).
Yet the very purpose of our pioneering efforts in [strict liability in tort] was to relieve
the plaintiff from problems of proof inherent in pursuing negligence ... and warranty
... remedies, and thereby "to insure that the costs of injuries resulting from defective
products are borne by the manufacturers .
"I.
Id. at 133, 501 P.2d at 1162, 104 Cal.
Rptr. at 442. (citations omitted)
86. Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp.. 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972):
Glass v. Ford Motor Co., 123 N.J. Super. 559, 304 A.2d 562 (Super. Ct. 1973).
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the plaintiff a significant burden which "rings of negligence," 87 the California
Supreme Court held that a plaintiff seeking recovery in strict liability need
not establish that the product defect which caused his injury made the product
unreasonably dangerous. Any other rule, concluded the court, would represent a step backward.8 8 In addition, the court recognized that conditioning
strict liability upon the finder of fact's conclusion that the product is, first,
defective, and second, unreasonably dangerous, establishes a bifurcated
standard of proof that is of necessity more difficult to reach than a unitary
one.

89

By abrogating the unreasonably dangerous requirement, these decisions
promote the purposes and public policy considerations underlying the development of strict liability in tort.9 0 By easing the plaintiff's burden of proof,
these two jurisdictions have taken steps to insure that the cost of injuries resulting from defective products will be borne by the manufacturer, the person
best able to prevent their occurrence.9' These decisions represent the betterreasoned rule and should be followed in the future in Minnesota.
E. The Fifth Requirement- Voluntary, Unusual, or Abnormal Handling
Perhaps the most perplexing portion of the Magnuson decision is the fifth
element of the "five-point" test, the requirement that plaintiff prove the "injury was not caused by any voluntary, unusual, or abnormal handling by the
plaintiff." The court's authority for this proposition is drawn from portions
of Comments g, h, and i of Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts. The comments read in part as follows:
g. Defective condition

....

The seller is not liable when he delivers the pro-

duct in a safe condition, and subsequent mishandling or other causes make it
harmful by the time it is consumed. The burden of proof that the product was
in a defective condition at the time that it left the hands of the particular seller

is upon the injured plaintiff; and unless evidence can be produced which will
92
support the conclusion that it was then defective, the burden is not sustained.

h. A product is not in a defective condition when it is safe for normal
handling and consumption. If the injury results from abnormal handling....
or from abnormal preparation for use

.

.. the seller is not liable ....
,1

i. Unreasonably dangerous. The rule stated in this section applies only
were the defective condition of the product makes it unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer.... The article sold must be dangerous to an extent

beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who
purchases it, with
9 4 the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its
characteristics.
87. Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 132, 501 P.2d 1153, 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr.
433,442 (1972).
88. Id.
89. Id.

90. See note 8supra.
91. See Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 113, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972).
92. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment g at 351 (1965).
93. Id. comment h at 351-52.
94. Id.comment iat 352-53.
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These comments have been inconsistently interpreted by the courts, generating a confusion which the Minnesota Supreme Court compounded in
Magnuson and Waite. The fifth element is difficult to understand, particularly since it appears to be drawn from the quoted comments of the Restatement. Apparently, abnormal handling refers to Comment h, which discusses
misuse or abuse of a product. The term "unusual" handling appears to be
repetitious of the term "abnormal" handling. The term "voluntary" is particularly confusing. It seems to refer to the use of a product with awareness of
the existence of a defect in the product.
For purposes of clarity, the fifth element of the decision should not be construed as referring to mishandling of a product. Mishandling, according to
Comment g of the Restatement, refers to alteration of a product at some
time after it is delivered in a safe condition by the maker of the product. Thus,
it seems clear that "mishandling" does not constitute part of that fifth element for purposes of analysis. The mishandling aspect of a strict liability case
is more properly viewed as a part of two essential elements of plaintiff's
proof, i.e., that the product was defective and that the defect was the proximate cause of his injury." If the product causing injury has been altered, it is
arguable that it is not defective. If it is established that the alteration made
the product dangerous, the.plaintiffs proof will fail, since he will be unable to
prove the existence of a defect or that the defect was the proximate cause of
his injury.
This leaves, as part of the fifth element, the issue of misuse, abnormal use,
or abuse of a product. The Magnuson decision applies these elements as part
of the plaintiff's burden of proof. Whether the defendant's product was
properly used is a relevant consideration according to strict liability theory."
Evidence of misuse or improper use of the product, either by the plaintiff or
by any person other than the defendant tends to disprove causation or the
97
existence of a defect.
Since a manufacturer is entitled to expect a normal use of his product, it is
generally recognized that a plaintiff who used a product for a purpose
neither intended nor reasonably foreseeable by the defendant is barred from
recovery.99 The issue of misuse thus depends upon whether the manufacturer
could have reasonably foreseen the use of the product, 99 since he is under a
duty to manufacture products which are reasonably safe for all foreseeable
uses, including those which are abnormal.' It is, therefore, generally agreed
95. For a discussion of mishandling, see notes 57 to 66 supra and accompanying text.
96. 1 R. HURSH& H. BAILEY,supra note 39,§5A:12.

97. 1 R. HURSH& H. BAILEY, supra note 61,§4:40.
98. Greeno v. Clark Equip. Co., 237 F. Supp. 427 (N.D. Ind. 1965); O.S. Stapley Co. v.
Miller, 103 Ariz. 556, 447 P.2d 248 (1968); Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 45 111. 2d 418, 261
N.E.2d 305 (1970).
99. Dale & Hilton, Use of the Product-When Is It Abnormal?, 4 WILLAMETTE L.J. 350,
363 (1967).
100. Hall v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). See also
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that a manufacturer may be held liable for an injury caused by a defect in the
design of a product even though the plaintiff misused the product, if that
misuse was reasonably foreseeable.'
In discussing the misuse issue in Magnuson, however, the Minnesota Supreme Court appeared to deviate from this general rule, stating:
In this state it would appear that plaintiff, as part of his case, where the
condition is obvious, must show that he made proper use of the product. Defendant agrees that the use of this snowmobile in hunting fox was not unusual,
accidents can occur, but the doctrine plaintiff seeks to recovery under is strict
liability, and not absolute liability. Plaintiff has the burden of proving proper
use of the machine as part of his case, and, being aware of the condition and
voluntarily doing what he0 did,
he has not sustained this burden, and there was
2
no question for the jury.

The difficulty with this rationale is two-fold. First, who has the burden of
proof on the issue of misuse of a product remains unclear. Second, the court
makes the question of misuse turn on the plaintiff's awareness of a defect.
As to the burden of proof in cases involving a misuse of a product, i.e., a
use of a product neither intended nor reasonably foreseeable, the courts are
split.13 The courts requiring the plaintiff to prove a normal use of the product

do so on the theory that imposing such a requirement on the plaintiff is really
nothing more than making him prove that he was injured by a defect in a
product made by the manufacturer. The validity of this point of view is
illustrated by referring to the definition of defect cited with approval by the
court in Magnuson. °4 Under a warranty/strict liability definition of defect, a
plaintiff must prove that the product was not fit for the ordinary purposes for
which it was intended. 0 n If the plaintiff fails to do so, he will fail in proving
one of the essential elements of a strict liability case.
If this point of view is taken, it seems absurd to make the defense of misuse
turn on one of the essential elements of a plaintiff's proof in a strict liability
case. Characterizing misuse as a defense serves only to muddy the issue of the
existence of a defect. Since the plaintiff must show, as part of his case, that he
was injured by a defect in a product made by the defendant, the defendant can
offer proof that the plaintiff used the product for a purpose neither intended
nor reasonably foreseeable. His evidence tends to rebut the essential elements
Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968) (holding that in determining the
use for which products must be reasonably safe, the manufacturer has a duty to take into consideration the environment in which the product will be used).
101. Thomas v. General Motor Corp., 13 Cal. App. 3d 81,91 Cal. Rptr. 301 (Ct. App. 1970)
(holding that a manufacturer may be held liable for a defect in the design of a product where its
misuse by the plaintiff was reasonably foreseeable); Byrnes v. Economic Mach. Co., 41 Mich.
App. 192, 201, 200 N.W.2d 104, 108 (1972) ("A manufacturer has a duty to use reasonable care
in designing his product to guard against unreasonable risk. [Citations omitted] This may even
include misuse which may be reasonably anticipated.").
102. 285 Minn. at 45, 171 N.W.2d at 209.
103. See generally I R. HURSH & H. BAILEY, supra note 61, § 4:40.
104. 285 Minn. at 39, 171 N.W.2d at 206.
105. Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965).
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of a strict liability case and, if the jury accepts the defendant's rebuttal evidence, it will return a verdict for the defendant.
A good illustration of these proof problems can be found in those cases
denominated as "res ipsa loquitur." There the plaintiff must prove that
he was injured by a defect in a product made by the defendant and that the
defect existed when it left the defendant's hands. 0 6 In the res ipsa cases it is
necessary for the plaintiff to rely upon certain circumstantial inferences to
prove that he was injured by a defect that existed when the product left the
manufacturer's hands. 107 Where the product has been destroyed, and no expert testimony is available to establish the existence of a defect, the plaintiff
may prove the defect by showing the absence of his own misuse of a product
and the absence of such misuse by any intervening parties.108 When this is
done, the plaintiff will reach the jury on the strict liability issue. 09
In such situations, the issue of misuse of the product must be disproved by
the plaintiff. If he is unable to do so, he will not be entitled to a res ipsa instruction and may lose his case on a motion for a directed verdict. If, however, the court is satisfied that the plaintiff has sufficiently negatived any misuse of the product, the case will go to the jury, which will decide whether the
plaintiff has proved the elements of his case by a preponderance of the evidence. The burden of proof on the misuse issue is, therefore, quite clearly
on the plaintiff.
Many of the cases stating that the plaintiff has the burden of proving his
freedom from misuse are explainable as res ipsa cases, in which the circumstantial inferences necessary to the application of the doctrine must be
established by the plaintiff." 0 Denominating misuse of the product as a
defense is inaccurate in those cases, since the issue is raised of necessity by the
plaintiff. Any evidence the defendant may have will tend to rebut the showing
made by the plaintiff, forcing courts in some cases to rule as a matter of law
that no defect exists or that the defect was not present at the time the product
left the defendant's hands."'
When the plaintiffs proof is more substantial, he will have no need to rely
upon the procedural device of res ipsa loquitur, and thus may argue that he
need not establish the absence of his own misuse. Such cases present the question of whether the plaintiff should be permitted to shift, somehow, the
burden of proof on the issue of misuse to the defendant. If the plaintiff pro106. Lee v. Crookston Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 290 Minn. 321, 329, 188 N.W.2d 426, 432
(1971).
107. Holkestad v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 288 Minn. 249, 257, 180 N.W.2d 860, 865-66
(1970).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. E.g., Lee v. Crookston Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 290 Minn. 321, 188 N.W.2d 426 (1971);
Holkestad v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 288 Minn. 249, 180 N.W.2d 860 (1970). See also I R.
HURSH & H. BAILEY, supra note 41, § 5A:12.
111. Kerr v. Corning Glass Works, 284 Minn. 115, 119, 169 N.W.2d 587, 589 (1969).
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duces an expert who testifies that in his opinion the product was not safe for a
particular use, does the defendant somehow assume the burden of disproving
this testimony by a preponderance of the evidence?
Though Magnuson seeks to avoid this seeming inequity by requiring the
plaintiff to negative his own misuse in every instance, the issue is in reality
a false one. In situations of this nature the courts must take a more pragmatic
view of fact situations, avoiding the highly structured and sterilized viewpoint
of the court in Magnuson. Under appropriate instructions the essential
elements of a products liability case can be presented to the jury for their
consideration without a strained after-the-fact analysis and categorization of
a plaintiff's conduct.
IV.

THE CONCEPT OF AWARENESS

The concept of awareness permeates the "five-point" Magnuson test and,
thus, may serve as the focus of analysis. In effect, the Magnuson court ruled
as a matter of law that a plaintiffs awareness of a defective condition will bar
his recovery under the strict liability doctrine." 2 As noted earlier, the plaintiffs awareness of a defective condition not only takes an otherwise obviously
defective product out of the defective and unreasonably dangerous category,
but also, when coupled with his voluntary use of the product, constitutes a
misuse and the proximate cause of any injury he may sustain." 3 Thus, the
plaintiff's awareness of the defect is relevant not only in proving the defective
and unreasonably dangerous condition of a product, but also the proper use
of the product to establish that his injury was not caused by any voluntary,
unusual, or abnormal handling.
This latter requirement may mean that a plaintiff who was aware of the
defect must prove that his injury was not caused by his voluntary handling of
the product. The court so intimated in Magnuson while discussing abnormal
use and the burden of proving proper use, "Plaintiff has the burden of
proving proper use of the machine as part of his case, and, being aware of the
condition and voluntarily doing what he did, he has not sustained this burden.
. . " (emphasis
.
added)."' That is the only plausible explanation of the presence of "voluntary" in the fifth requirement.
The better reasoned rule does not inquire whether the plaintiff voluntarily
used the product after discovering the defect, but rather, whether the plaintiff
made an unreasonable use of the product after becoming aware of the danger
presented by the defective condition."' It is not hard to imagine a use of a
product which would be totally reasonable under the circumstances, even
though the user was aware of the existence of an obvious defect." 6 Where the
112. 285 Minn. at 44, 171 N.W.2d at 208.
113. Id. at 45, 171 N.W.2d at 209.
114. See text accompanying note 42 supra.
115. 8 Cal. 3d at l45,501 P.2d at 1170, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 450.
116. A good example would be General Motor's Corvair. Many were aware of the presence
of the gas tank in the rear of the car, but normal use of the car was considered reasonable. It
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user does make such a reasonable use, he should not be denied recovery, for
he has not misused the product,'17 nor has he assumed the risk of injury unless
he was also aware of the danger or risk presented by the defect."' Minnesota's decision to adopt the contrary rule will produce unjust results." 9
Other jurisdictions have disavowed any distinction between patent and
latent defects. Modern theories of products liability do not preclude recovery
solely because the danger is obvious, much less when only the defect is obvious. 2 " These theories hold that the manufacturer should bear the costs of
injuries caused by his products because he is in a better position to control
and eliminate dangerous defects than is the consumer. Thus, imposing strict
liability may be more useful where the defect is patent than where it is latent,
as the manufacturer will be even better able to discover patent defects than
latent ones and thus prevent their recurrence.12' Second, though products
liability does not employ a fault standard, the additional element of the manufacturer's fault, present when a product is marketed with a patent and danwould be illogical to expect a consumer who has spent a fair sum of money on a new product
to forego use of the product because a defect is obvious where the danger is not.
117. Misuse occurs when a product is used in an unforeseeable or unintended manner.
I R. HURSH & H. BAILEY, supra note 39, § 5A:12. Consequently, the mere fact that a user is
aware of a defect should not constitute misuse or abnormal handling when the use is reasonably
foreseeable or intended by the manufacturer.
118. In Luque v. McLean, 8 Cal. 3d 136, 145, 501 P.2d 1163, 1170, 104 Cal. Rptr. 443, 44950 (1972), the court expressed that the "awareness language" in the Greenman decision means
in effect that a person urging strict liability must not have assumed the risk of the defective
product. As such, it concluded, "for such a defense to arise, the user or consumer must become
aware of the defect and danger and still proceed unreasonably to make use of the product."
(emphasis added). Id. at 146, 501 P.2d at 1170, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 450.
See also Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 45 I11.
2d 418, 423, 261 N.E.2d 305, 308 (1970),
quoting People ex rel. General Motors Corp. v. Bua, 37 111.
2d 180, 226 N.E.2d 6 (1967), where
contributory negligence is defined as "voluntarily and unreasonably proceeding to encounter
a known danger, or proceeding unreasonably to make use of a product after discovery of a
defect and becoming aware of the danger."
119. See Luque v. McLean, 8 Cal. 3d 136, 501 P.2d 1163, 104 Cal. Rptr. 443 (1972).
120. Luque v. McLean, 8 Cal. 3d 136,501 P.2d 1163,104 Cal. Rptr. 443 (1972); Pike v. Frank
G. Hough Co., 2 Cal. 3d 465, 467 P.2d 229, 85 Cal. Rptr. 629 (1970); Thompson v. Package
Machinery Co., 22 Cal. App. 3d 188, 99 Cal. Rptr. 281 (Ct. App. 1971); Wright v. MasseyHarris, Inc., 68 I1. App. 2d 70, 215 N.E.2d 465 (1966) (allowing a cause of action in strict liability for an obvious defect in design).
121. "The purpose of such liability is to insure that the costs of injuries resulting from
defective products are borne by the manufacturers that put such products on the
market rather than by the injured persons who are powerless to protect themselves .. " Requiring the defect to be latent would severely limit the cases in which
the financial burden would be shifted to the manufacturer. It would indeed be
anomalous to allow a plaintiff to prove that a manufacturer was negligent in
marketing an obviously defective product, but to preclude him from establishing the
manufacturer's strict liability for doing the same thing. The result would be to
immunize from strict liability manufacturers who callously ignore patent dangers
in their products while subjecting to such liability those who innocently market
products with latent defects. Luque v. McLean, 8 Cal. 3d 136, 142, 501 P.2d 1163,
1169, 104 Cal. Rptr. 443, 449 (1972), quoting in part from Greenman v. Yuba
Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63, 377 P.2d 897,901, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701,
(1962).
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gerous defect, makes the imposition of the costs of injury upon the manufacturer seem more rather than less equitable.' The patent-latent dichotomy
would reward with immunity manufacturers who "callously ignore patent
strictly liable those who "innocently
dangers in their products" while holding
2 3
market products with latent defects."'
It is possible, however, that the Minnesota court did not intend to make a
distinction between latent and patent defects with its awareness requirement,
but rather to require that the defect be one as to which the plaintiff had not
assumed the risk of injury."' A close reading of Magnuson reveals that the
plaintiff's awareness of the defect constitutes a bar to his recovery in much
the same manner as assumption of risk. It has been suggested that the
function of the requirement is to borrow the concept of assumption of risk
from negligence theory."' That defense, however, has traditionally required
not only an awareness of the defective condition, but also a subjective appreciation of the danger and an unreasonable use of the product in light of that
would be
appreciation. 26 It is inconceivable that a less exacting standard
127
applied in a strict liability action, given its policy and purpose.
The MinnesotA rule that mere awareness of the defective condition is sufficient to bar recovery remains erroneous, then, even when viewed as an
assumption of risk rule.' The better reasoned authorities hold that assump122. Id.
123. Id.
124. See note 49 supra.
125. Luque v. McLean, 8 Cal. 3d 136, 145, 501 P.2d 1163, 1169, 104 Cal. Rptr. 443, 449
(1972): "On the other hand, as plaintiff recognizes, the awareness language in . . . Greenman...
is not meaningless. It declares in effect that a person urging strict liability must not have
assumed the risk of the defective product."
126. Springrose v. Willmore, 292 Minn. 23, 192 N.W.2d 826 (1971); Parness v. Economics
Laboratory, Inc., 284 Minn. 381, 170 N.W.2d 554 (1969); Knutson v. Arrigoni Bros., 275 Minn.
408, 147 N.W.2d 561 (1966). In Springrose, the Minnesota court defined the type of conduct
which would bar recovery as follows: "Implied assumption of risk in its secondary sense as an
affirmative defense in tort actions is to be limited to those situations in which the actor's
voluntary encountering of a known and appreciated risk is unreasonable." Id. at 23, 192
N.W.2d at 826.
127. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment cat 350 (1965).
128. Dorsey v. Yoder Co., 331 F. Supp. 753,765 (E.D. Pa. 1971); Greeno v. Clark Equip. Co.,
237 F. Supp. 427, 429 (N.D. Ind. 1965); O.S. Stapley Co. v. Miller, 103 Ariz. 556, 561,447 P.2d
248, 253 (1968): Luque v. McLean, 8 Cal. 3d 136, 145, 501 P.2d 1163, 1170, 104 Cal. Rptr.
443, 450 (1972); Ruiz v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 15 Cal. App. 3d 462,470, 93 Cal. Rptr.
270, 275 (Ct. App. 1971); Lee v. Crookston Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 290 Minn. 321, 329-30, 188
N.W.2d 426, 432 (1971) (requiring awareness of the danger as well as of the defect for assumption of risk); Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing, 445 N.J. 434, 458-59, 212 A.2d 769, 783 (1965);
Halepeska v. Callihan Interests, Inc., 371 S.W.2d 368, 380-81 (Tex. 1963).
In Barth v. B.F. Goodrich, 265 Cal. App. 2d 228, 71 Cal. Rptr. 306 (Ct. App. 1968), the court
stated:
The only form of plaintiffs negligence that is a defense to strict liability is that which
consists of voluntarily and unreasonably proceeding to encounter a known danger,
more commonly referred to as assumption of risk. For such a defense to arise, the user
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tion of risk, while a valid defense in a strict liability action, 2 ' consists there,
just as in a negligence action, of the plaintiff's "voluntarily and unreasonably
1
proceeding to encounter a known danger."' 30
Under this rule the plaintiffs
awareness is only one element to be proved in establishing the defense, 3 ' and
is by no means the controlling factor.
Other courts which have considered the issue have said that a plaintiff's use
of a product with notice of its defect would not bar recovery in a strict liabil,ty action, 32 for it is essential to the defense of assumption of risk that there
be a knowledge and appreciation of the risk 3 3 as well as an awareness of the
physical presence of the defect. As the Illinois Supreme Court has noted, 34
the test of whether a user has assumed the risk of using a dangerously defective
product is fundamentally subjective in the sense that it is plaintiffs own
knowledge, understanding, and appreciation of the danger which must be
assessed rather than that of the reasonably prudent person.
In failing to apply this subjective knowledge test Magnuson not only
departs from the weight of authority, but also reaches an illogical result. The
plaintiff cannot assume the risk of a danger of which he is ignorant. A rule
that requires only the plaintiff's awareness of the defect to establish a defense
defeats the policy considerations underlying the doctrine of strict liability by
imposing upon the plaintiff a higher standard of proof than that required for
a negligence action despite strict liability's avowed purpose of setting up a
3 5
lesser standard of proof.
This error is compounded by requiring the plaintiff to prove that he was
unaware of the defect. If the function of the "awareness" concept is to carry
over from the field of negligence, the assumption of risk defense, 36 it should
properly be raised as an affirmative defense. The California Supreme Court
or consumer must become aware of the defect and the danger and still proceed
unreasonably to make use of the product. Id. at 243, 71 Cal. Rptr. at 314.
Similarly, the Halepeska court held that since the plaintiff did not have full knowledge and
appreciation of the risk arising from the defect, no defense based on voluntarily encountering a
recognized risk could be sustained. See also I R. HURSH & H. BAILEY, supra note 39, § 5A:26.
129. See authorities cited note 128 supra.
130. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment n at 356 (1965).
131. Sweeney v. Mathews & Co., 46 Ill. 2d 64, 66, 264 N.E.2d 170, 171 (1970) ("In determining [whether particular conduct constitutes an assumption of risk] a trier of fact may consider such factors as the user's age, experience, knowledge and understanding, as well as the
obviousness of the defect and the danger it poses."); Higgins v. Paul Hardeman, Inc., 457
S.W.2d 943, 948 (Mo. App. 1970).
132. Higgins v. Paul Hardeman, Inc., 457 S.W.2d 943, 948 (Mo. App. 1970): "[Tihe gut issue
is not whether the defect was discovered but whether the product was unreasonably used after
discovery of the defect."
133. Ruiz v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 15 Cal. App. 3d 462, 470, 93 Cal. Rptr. 270,
275 (Ct. App. 1971): RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment n at 356 (1965).
134. Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 45 I11.
2d 418,430, 261 N.E.2d 305, 312 (1970).
135. Lee v. Crookston Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 290 Minn. 321, 188 N.W.2d 426 (1971):
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496D (1965).
136. See text accompanying notes 124 & 125 supra.
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has expressly held that assumption of the risk is a defense, and that it is therefore improper to instruct the jury that the plaintiff must prove that he had
not assumed the risk. 37 Placing the burden of proof on the plaintiff not only
impedes his recovery unnecessarily but is also contrary to the weight of
authority and inconsistent with the policy considerations behind the adoption
of strict tort liability.
V.

CONCLUSION

The strict liability formulation now rather firmly established by the holdings of Magnuson and Waite, is rendered analytically dysfunctional by its
emphasis on "limiting factors" that defeat the policies which originally gave
rise to strict liability. Its insistence that the plaintiffs awareness should bar
his recovery permeates all elements of the so-called "five-point" test of
liability, creating doubt as to whether the victim of a dangerous product with
a patent defect has a cause of action at all. The awareness bar also confuses
and subverts the familiar doctrine of assumption of risk to the detriment of
the victim.
The fifth point of the "five-point" test, which requires the plaintiff to prove
that his injury was not caused by his voluntary, unusual, or abnormal handling
of the product is not analytically useful. It needlessly complicates the
naturally troublesome causation questions and forces the injured victim to
bear all of the costs of foreseeable misuses of the product, no matter how
serious the defect. The unreasonably dangerous requirement, too, is notably
ungenerous to the accident victim.
A strict liability rule, if it fails to ease the burden which would be imposed
on the plaintiff were he proceeding on a negligence theory, fails altogether.
The rigid and formularized "limiting factors" of the Magnuson-Waite test,
literally interpreted and applied, may make proving up a case of strict liability even more difficult in some respects than proving up a case of negligence.
Because of this failure to effectuate the broad remedial purposes of the strict
liability doctrine, the Magnuson-Waite test should be rejected in favor of a
more fluid and generous analysis, such as that employed by the California
courts.
137. Luque v. McLean, 8 Cal. 3d 136, 145, 501 P.2d 1163, 1169, 104 Cal. Rptr. 443, 449
(1972).
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